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cate them efficiently, have transformed into weak finan-
cial markets which sparked the economic debacle (Stiglitz
1998). One factor that remains undisputed, however, is
macroeconomic stability. Many analysts (e.g., Montes
1997) cite the sound macroeconomic fundamentals in
the region as one of the reasons the economies should
be able to weather the crisis and also one of the reasons
why the extent of the currency depreciations was unwar-
ranted.
The Philippines was pointedly left out of the list of
the HPAEs. Its economic performance over the past forty
years has been punctuated by boom-bust episodes, ef-
fectively removing any semblance of sustainable growth.
The incoming president, as a matter of fact, will be in a
curiously similar position as his two immediate post-
Marcos predecessors: he will be inheriting an economy
reeling from a crisis. Macroeconomic stability has always
been an elusive goal.
To catch up with its neighbors, the Philippines has
implemented a number of structural reforms, especially
during the past twelve years. The more optimistic pun-
dits even say that these reforms were the reason why
the Philippines was the least affected by the regional
financial crisis. While this position may be true to a lim-
ited extent, these same reforms have had some adverse
effects. The trade-offs involved in the various reform mea-
sures should be considered very carefully. These trade-
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*This article also appears in The Financial Survey (July-August 1998).
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ust five years ago, the World Bank published a
book on the phenomenal success of the econo-
mies of East Asia. The volume analyzed the
various factors that led to sustained economic
growth of the so-called High Powered Asian Econo-
mies (HPAEs): Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Strangely
enough, the absence of some of these factors is now
cited as the explanation for the financial crisis presently
gripping most of these economies. For example, promot-
ing competition, especially through export-oriented poli-
cies, was hailed as one of the key ingredients of their
rapid growth. Yet lack of competition in the business con-
glomerates is seen as one of the critical failings; and
what were previously viewed as strong financial markets
that were able to mobilize huge flows of savings and allo-
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The Philippines escaped the worst of the
Asian crisis. Now it needs to ensure that







offs may be the  reason why policy contradictions seemed
to exist in  the East Asian economies at the onset of the
crisis.
Trade liberalization and macroeconomic stability
The performance of the Philippine economy has
been incessantly linked to the fortunes of its industry
sector. The orthodox view of the problems plaguing the
latter, particularly the manufacturing sector, has come
up with the following  major conclusions (Medalla et al.
1995):
v More than three decades of protection has
been very costly in terms of its inherent penalty on ex-
ports, its seriously adverse impact on resource alloca-
tion and dynamic efficiency losses arising from lack of
competition;
v Reform toward a more liberal, and neutral trade
policy is necessary to propel the economy to a higher
level of industrialization.
Along these lines, the government embarked on an
ambitious trade liberalization program beginning in 1981
consisting of tariff reform and the steady elimination of
quantitative restrictions and other nontariff barriers. This
was interrupted by the economic crisis in 1984-85 but
was pursued in earnest from 1986 onward. As a result
of the trade reform package, the average nominal tariff
rate fell from 28 percent in 1990 to 13 percent in 1997.
The behavior of an average effective tariff is shown in
Figure 1. Quantitative import restrictions were lifted on
all agricultural imports (except rice) in March 1996, and
were accompanied by their tariffication as stipulated un-
der the World Trade Organization (WTO). Trade liberaliza-
tion will continue beyond 1997. The average nominal tar-
iff will be reduced gradually until a uniform rate of five
percent will be imposed in the year 2004.
The arguments for liberalizing the trade regime have
been largely confined in the microeconomic sphere with
efficiency considerations being the primary focus. Com-
prehensive discussions on the potential macroeconomic
effects are limited. One such approach (Yap 1997) uses
a three-gap model to show that a reduction in the tariff
level will lead to an unambiguous decline in the GDP
Figure 1
Effective Tariff Rate with Respect
to Dutiable Imports, 1980-1996
t = tariff revenue/value of dutiable imports
growth rate if lower tariffs result in a reduction of the
surplus in the government's primary account. Lower gov-
ernment saving leads to tighter overall investment con-
straints. The actual impact of a tariff reduction depends
on, among other things, the import income elasticity.
Empirical results indicate that the condition of a contrac-
tion in the government primary surplus is satisfied in the
Philippine case.
Table 1 shows that government revenue from cus-
toms duties has been declining steadily since 1980.
Government officials have acknowledged that this has
been the main reason why tax revenue performance has
leveled off causing actual collections to fall short of tar-
gets in 1997. It should come as no surprise, therefore,
that while Korea, Thailand and Indonesia consider the
financial sector to be a focal point of policy following the
1997 crisis, in the Philippines, the fiscal sector has been
identified by the government economic managers and the
IMF as the principal concern for 1998 and 1999.
The key message derived from this analysis is that
policymakers must be cautious about the impact of eco-
nomic reform on macroeconomic stability. This is impor-
tant in the light of the contention of Dani Rodrik (1996),
an economics professor at Harvard University, that, in












become common to lump together a wide range of poli-
cies under the label “import substitution policies.” Con-
fusion then arises because failures were often
misattributed to microeconomic policies (e.g., indiscrimi-
nate protection), when their sources lay either with
unsustainable macroeconomic policies or bureaucratic
and institutional shortcomings.
Nevertheless, estimates of some trade statistics
show that there have been efficiency gains from the trade
reforms in terms of lowering effective protection rates
(EPRs)—in absolute terms and in terms of variations
among the different sectors of the economy—and lower-
ing of domestic resource costs, i.e., the opportunity cost
of protecting specific sectors. But these numbers (the
effective protection rate and domestic resource cost)
follow the trend in the level of tariffs and taken on their
own, can be viewed only as potential efficiency gains.
The record shows that despite the reforms, growth in the
Philippine manufacturing sector has slowed down for ten
consecutive quarters (1995Q4 - 1998Q1). It appears that
there may be no trade-off between microeconomic effi-
ciency and macroeconomic stability after all. In fairness
to the advocates of trade liberalization, an overvalued
currency, poor infrastructure, and low labor productivity—
which are persistent problems in the Philippines—may
have prevented the potential efficiency gains from being
realized.
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Tax revenue (% of GNP) 12.6 11.0 14.2 14.5 15.2 15.3 15.6 15.9 16.1 16.1
Tariff revenue (% of GNP) 3.9 2.8 4.3 5.1 5.3 5.5 4.7 5.0 4.6 3.7
Tariff revenue (% of tax revenue) 27.2 22.9 25.4 29.2 30.0 31.5 24.3 27.0 25.5 20.1
conglomerates resulting in loans of dubious quality. The
lack of transparency in the banking system and inad-
equate regulation and supervision led to a number of
bad loans which were exposed when the crisis struck.
This sweeping analysis tends to gloss over the fact
that similar crises have occurred in countries with so-
phisticated financial regulation (e.g., the U.S. savings and
loan debacle) and in places with high levels of transpar-
ency (e.g., Scandinavia) [Stiglitz 1998]. Moreover, two-
thirds of external bank lending in Indonesia was to the
nonbank private sector, indicating that foreign lenders
were willing to extend credit to Indonesian firms. The lat-
ter did not have to resort solely on behest loans from
“friendly” domestic banks.
Another line of argument lays the blame squarely
on the liberalization of the capital account and the liber-
alization of the banking sector as the cause of the weak-
nesses in the financial sector (Montes 1997). Ready ac-
cess to international credit amplified existing market fail-
ures leading to the profligacy of the private sector. This
led to overinvestment in certain areas (e.g., real estate)
reducing the profitability of many projects. The profit
squeeze led to bad loans and the subsequent fall in as-
set prices, triggering the capital outflow that caused sharp
depreciations of the domestic currencies. The latter then
sparked the downward economic spiral, particularly in
Indonesia, as it became more difficult to repay unhedged
foreign loans.
The Philippine capital account was liberalized in
September 1992. The financial sector was likewise liber-
alized in 1994 when ten foreign banks, in addition to the
existing four, were allowed to operate in the domestic
market. As a result, greater liquidity was introduced in
the system as indicated by the rising M3/GNP ratio (Fig-
ure 2). Economic data
clearly show that the Philip-
pines was on the verge of
mimicking the Thai and In-
donesian experience begin-
ning in 1996. Value added
in the real estate sector
surged in that year along
Financial liberalization and the East Asia crisis
A debate on the causes of the East Asia financial
crisis has developed over the past year, sometimes par-
allel to the debate about the sources of their erstwhile
phenomenal growth. The more popular view is that the
weaknesses in the financial sector were brought about
by the cozy relationship between banks and business
Table 1: Behavior of Tariff Revenue4
Notes Policy
July 1998
with a sharp rise in the share of loans to that sector
(Table 2). Consumer loans were also rising rapidly and
dollar liabilities of commercial banks increased dramati-
cally. Portfolio investment of nonresidents had accumu-
lated to $5.2 billion by 1996 creating a virtual time bomb
in a country where foreign exchange reserves amounted
to only $11 billion. In other words, the Philippines was a
latecomer to the game and this fortuity—not superior
economic policies—explains why it was not as battered
by the crisis as Thailand and Indonesia.
No doubt, the real reasons behind the East Asia
debacle lie somewhere between the two interpretations
cited above. The substance of the arguments should nev-
ertheless buttress the lesson derived from the discus-
sion on trade reform: policymakers must be aware of any
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Jan Feb Mar
Growth rate in value added 4.1  -0.4 1.5 2.6 3.8 5.9 10.7 6.8
of real estate
Growth rate in loans outstanding - 19.2 36.1 10.1 37.4 24.6 97.2 42.6 34.3 30.0 27.9
to real estate
Share in loans outstanding 16.9 18.3 20.1 16.7 18.3 16.8 21.8 24.6 24.0 25.3 25.7
to real estate
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potential trade-offs between microeconomic efficiency
gains and macroeconomic stability.
Creating relevant institutions, establishing appro-
priate regulatory frameworks, and formulating a strate-
gic technology policy—both in a domestic context and an
international setting—should be part of any policy agenda
in order to minimize the adverse impact of such policy
trade-offs. This may well form the bulk of the work of
policymakers into the next century. Otherwise global-
ization will always be a threat and not what it should be:
a challenge and opportunity.  4
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